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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I tell my law students that we are gladiators.  We slay injustices while 
protecting liberty.  We battle other gladiators, incapacitate violent criminals, 
and watch over those without a voice.  When the people ring the bell signaling 
the need to restructure the functions of institutions and practices, lawyers enter 
the arena ready for combat.  In America, the inimitable skills of counsel are 
constitutionally recognized and celebrated.  The Framers considered the right 
to counsel so critical to the republic that it is enshrined in the text of the Sixth 
Amendment.  Whether majorities of the Supreme Court have held this right in 
such high esteem is debatable.  The Court’s jurisprudence has erratically ex-
panded and restricted the right to counsel, leaving its scope far from certain. 
Beginning in 1932 with Powell v. Alabama,1 the U.S. Supreme Court has 
grappled with defining the constitutional contours of the right to counsel.  
While both Powell and Gideon v. Wainwright2 spurred a hope that criminal 
 
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.  
I would like to thank my colleagues at McKinney who continue to support all of my 
endeavors at the law school.  I would like to also thank my Lutie sisters, Florence 
Roisman, Nic Terry, and Robin Barnes for your time and feedback.  I owe special grat-
itude to my colleague George Wright for reviewing and commenting on multiple drafts 
of this Article.  And thank you to my Courtney Lee for encouraging the lion. 
 1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
1
Silva: Ringing the Bell
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
134 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
justice – particularly in the South – would change, Strickland v. Washington3 
suppressed any existing optimism that such change would be meaningful.  Nev-
ertheless, recent cases such as Padilla v. Kentucky,4 Missouri v. Frye,5 and 
Lafler v. Cooper6 have reinvigorated the discourse concerning the constitu-
tional boundaries surrounding the Sixth Amendment guarantee, offering a hint 
that the Court may be redirecting its jurisprudence.  These new cases not only 
present an opportunity to re-examine the substantive doctrine, but also to fur-
nish an occasion to review and build upon existing theories of judicial decision-
making. 
In constructing theoretical frames used to evaluate judicial decision-mak-
ing, scholars wrestle with opinions that do not rest on neutral constitutional 
principles but provide socio-politically acceptable outcomes.  This phenome-
non is constantly evaluated and rationalized in a myriad of ways, producing a 
rich literature that may be utilized to explain and resolve vital questions regard-
ing the status of fundamental rights.  This Article aims to add to this existing 
literature by analyzing judicial decision-making within the context of the right 
to counsel.  While it is arguable that these cases rest on neutral principles, a 
closer examination reveals that the Court’s fidelity to an underlying principle 
of equality is changeable, ebbs and flows, and may be influenced by consider-
ations outside of doctrine – namely American political culture.  Through the 
application of interest convergence theory, this Article hopes to explain the 
Court’s fluctuating jurisprudence by identifying and examining eras of conver-
gence and divergence through surveying the domestic and international climate 
at the time of a given decision. 
“Interest convergence,” a theoretical frame developed by the late Profes-
sor Derrick Bell, contends that the jurisprudential interests or “rights” of mi-
nority groups are only judicially recognized when they support the values and 
interests of the dominant group.7  I argue that Professor Bell’s theory, while 
intensely criticized,8 provides a kernel of truth that may help competing sides 
 
 3. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 4. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 5. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012). 
 6. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). 
 7. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Conver-
gence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Brown]. 
 8. The following articles apply, assess, or critique interest convergence: Justin 
Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 157 
(2011); Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the 
Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 939 (2007); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roun-
delay, Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 23, 63 (2006); Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence 
(Dis)Course: Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1061, 1114–18 (2006); Bryan L. Adamson, The H’aint in the (School) House: The 
Interest Convergence Paradigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 
CAL. W. L. REV. 173, 174 (2006); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell 
Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1510 (2005); Sheryll D. 
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in the justice system find a way to work together.  Having roots in “rational 
choice” models of decision-making, Bell’s theory posits that a confluence of 
interests determine judicial decisions.9  For him, judges, traditionally members 
of the dominant group, bring values and interests into the judicial decision-
making process.10  In deciding cases, judges tend to issue decisions with an 
outcome that maintains the status quo, as well as language that mirrors the po-
litical culture, instead of offering a meaningful remedy that may disrupt the 
social order.11  With doctrinal periods of expansion and retrenchment, the ju-
risprudential sway of the Court’s “contradiction closing cases” concerning the 
right to counsel appear to reflect the political culture at the time the case was 
litigated.  This Article will demonstrate the way in which external considera-
tions may have influenced the Court with first recognition and expansion of the 
right to counsel in Powell and Gideon, the Court’s subsequent restriction of the 
right in Strickland and Hill,12 and the Court’s slight expansion of the right in 
recent cases such as Padilla, Frye, and Lafler.  In this Article, I argue that in-
terest convergence helps explain the Court’s trend on the issue of right to coun-
sel.  With the emphasis on seeing “the world as it is rather than how we might 
 
Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology Through Inter-
est Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 271 n.67 (2005); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, 
Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1436, 1474 (2005); Maria Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and 
Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyer v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 
1377 (2005); Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1501, 1505 (2004); Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration 
Past, Present, and Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795, 827 (2004); Paul Frymer & John D. 
Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance 
of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 678 (2004); Steven A. Ramirez, Games 
CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s Board-
rooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1612–13 (2004); Daria 
Roithmayr, Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 213 
(2004); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race 
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1764 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND 
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela 
P. Harris eds., 2002)); Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections 
on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 
2279, 2284 (2001); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of 
Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2539 (2001); Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and 
Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 
871–72 (1996); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration 
Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 
283–84 n.41 (1996); Christine H. Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Atti-
tudes on School Desegregation Issues During the Four Decade Evolution of the Plans, 
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 630–33 (1995); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a 
Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 66 (1988). 
 9. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 521. 
 10. Id. at 523. 
 11. Id. at 526–27. 
 12. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
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want it to be,” the interest convergence paradigm may be a tool in addressing 
critical issues that continue to linger in American society by allowing for con-
temporary socio-political realities to enter the analysis. 
In applying interest convergence, I do attempt to follow Bell’s model of 
analysis in that I only provide a general overview of major occurrences and 
events, as opposed to offering a comprehensive evaluation of each specific ex-
ternal variable.  The purpose of this Article is to utilize the frame to identify 
eras of convergence and divergence by highlighting many seminal cases, as 
opposed to analyzing one specific era or case. 
I do not adopt the black-white binary paradigm of race.  Instead, I propose 
that the two constituent groups consist of the “dominant” group and the “sub-
ordinate group.”  The dominant group comprises upper class and wealthy, pri-
marily white, constituents with political capital and influence.  The subordinate 
group includes the working poor and minority groups who lack political capital 
and influence.  Who, or which group, should count as “dominant” or “subordi-
nate” may vary somewhat according to the context or issue.  Sometimes overall 
group wealth or group size is crucial, but in other contexts, the ability to organ-
ize efficiently at low cost may count more than sheer wealth or numbers of 
mere aggregates with less individually at stake.  I do, however, recognize the 
differences inherent in grouping racially diverse interests in one category and 
also realize the limitations it may place on the receptivity of my thesis.  Where 
appropriate, I do acknowledge and discuss the divisions within the subordinate 
group and potential causes.  This, or any other binary, obviously sacrifices de-
scriptive adequacy for the sake of a better combination of simplicity and ex-
planatory power.  However, in the quest to formulate a pragmatic analysis on 
the topic of right to counsel jurisprudence, I think it appropriate to cluster con-
stituents that share a similar interest at a similar time in one category for this 
limited purpose. 
In addition, the understanding of the “equality principle” in this Article 
differs from that of Bell.  For Bell, the equality principle is manifested in the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically guarantee-
ing racial equality.13  The equality principle in this Article refers to a more basic 
and abstract notion of equality in the vein of John Rawls and Ronald 
Dworkin.14  The cases reviewed below were primarily decided pursuant to the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as opposed to Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection, although there is some variation.15  In Sixth Amendment ju-
risprudence, the notion of equality appears more fluid.  It includes not only an 
equality of treatment under the law, but also an equality of opportunity.  While 
it does include a racial equality component, the jurisprudence has evolved to 
discuss equality more in terms of opportunity and equality among the social 
 
 13. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 522. 
 14. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068 (1975); see 
also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 81 (1971). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. 
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classes.  Equality also, at times, includes an element of fairness, making it dif-
ficult to separate the two substantive concepts.  In analyzing the development 
of the constitutional right to counsel, the equality principle must be flexible 
enough to reflect an accurate doctrinal interpretation of the concept in the con-
struction of the Sixth Amendment.  For purposes of this Article, the equality 
principle is thus understood to encompass more than racial equality. 
Part II provides a brief and basic overview of existing theoretical models 
of judicial decision-making and examines Bell’s interest convergence theory 
in depth.  This Part not only explains the interest convergence framework and 
“contradiction closing cases,” but also reviews the application of this theory by 
other scholars in different contexts.  Parts III to V examine eras of convergence 
and divergence throughout the development of right to counsel jurisprudence 
by employing the interest convergence frame.  Cases chosen for study were 
selected based on prominence in political culture and doctrinal parallels.  
Through the evaluation of key U.S. Supreme Court cases, Part III aims to 
demonstrate that when the values and interests of the dominant group converge 
with those of the subordinate group, as in Powell and Gideon, civil liberties are 
theoretically extended, granting concessions to the subordinate group.  How-
ever, when dominant interests diverge from those of the subordinate group, the 
interpretation of fundamental rights is constrained as manifested in Strickland 
and Hill.  Part III reviews the decisions in Powell and Gideon, finding an era 
of convergence allying interests on the principle of equality.  Part IV focuses 
on Strickland and Hill, uncovering a commonality between the decisions and 
the political culture: a retrenchment from the equality principle.  Part V dis-
cusses Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, concluding that a confluence of factors, 
namely mass incarceration and a concern with the effectiveness of criminal 
justice administration, worked to align the interests of the dominant group with 
the subordinate group.  Part VI concludes with a review of the thesis and com-
ments to consider moving forward. 
II.  JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
PARADIGM 
Firmly entrenched in our democratic system of government, the exercise 
of judicial review continues to be utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court.  As an 
academic genre, judicial decision-making remains a vibrant and rigorous topic 
of debate, offering an abundance of fresh critiques and innovative theories 
within every generation of scholars.  The numerous paradigms and frames em-
ployed to explain both the exercise of judicial review and outcomes in specific 
cases demonstrate the doctrine’s complexity and changeability.  This Article 
aims to build upon this practice and offer a new application of a highly influ-
ential and often criticized theory of judicial decision-making: interest conver-
gence. 
5
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A.  Overview of Existing Models 
Since Marbury v. Madison,16 the Court, through the power of judicial re-
view, has wielded constitutional authority to issue binding decisions premised 
on uncertain, and often criticized, bases.  Judicial review is understood to es-
tablish a union between the theoretical principles admired in the Constitution 
and actual practices in American political culture.17  The doctrine itself is prem-
ised upon the idea of constitutionalism, requiring “that legitimate governmen-
tal power is limited by fundamental principles contained in a source of higher 
law that supersedes policies adopted through the ordinary political process.”18  
In the United States, this higher law is the Constitution, and it is enforced 
through the exercise of judicial review.19  Marbury v. Madison thus established 
a counter-majoritarian force in the Court, with the constitutional power to in-
validate legislative action that it determined violated fundamental constitu-
tional principles.20 
Scholars have long struggled with understanding judicial decision-mak-
ing.21  “Formalists” contend that judges should decide cases by employing tra-
ditional modes of interpretation, including surveying case law, statutes, and 
constitutions.22  For formalists, judicial decision-making requires an assess-
ment of only facts and law.23  Normative concerns, such as morality and poli-
tics, are irrelevant to exercises in legal analysis.24 
 
 16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 17. Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutional Hypocrisy, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 557, 
557 (2011) [hereinafter Spann, Hypocrisy]. 
 18. Id. at 559. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. This Article is only concerned with four theories: formalism, legal realism, 
interpretivism, and critical race studies.  See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
(1961); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 432 (2005) (citing 
Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Le-
gal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001) (reviewing 
HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: 
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999)). 
 22. See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 1057–58; Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 
S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 438 (1985); SUPREME COURT DECISION–MAKING: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISTS APPROACHES 57–61 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 
1999). 
 23. Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 
LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010), http://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325210000121; RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 41 (2008). 
 24. Leiter, supra note 23. 
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In strict contrast to the position taken by formalists, legal realists argue 
that when jurisprudence fails to explain judicial decision-making, social sci-
ence will.25  This school of thought maintains that judicial interpretation mir-
rors the individual values and biases of judges.26  For legal realists, there is 
more to judicial determinations than a mechanical application of constitutional 
principles.27  One can never truly know the actual reasons for a judge’s deci-
sion.28 
An extension of realist philosophy, interpretivists argue that moral prin-
ciples and established institutional practices play some role in judicial decision-
making.29  For interpretivists, the process through which institutional practices 
determine rights follows from some moral principle that gives the institutional 
practice itself the role to make those decisions.30  Thus, the rights so determined 
have legitimate moral force. 
As an outgrowth of the realist and interpretivist movements, critical race 
and critical legal studies began to take shape.31  Critical race and critical legal 
theorists stressed that judicial interpretations of constitutional doctrine often 
tipped the outcome in favor of the dominant group.32  By emphasizing that such 
outcomes were both neutral and needed, judges could claim that decisions were 
appropriately detached from external influences.33  For example, Professor 
Girardeau Spann believes “legal doctrine is unable to provide determinate an-
swers to particular disputes.”34  He contends that the Supreme Court is akin to 
a third policymaking branch within a tricameral legislature, more likely to re-
flect the values of American political culture than the guardian of principles 
espoused in the Constitution.35  With this, Professor Spann declares judicial 
review should be abolished.36  While not calling for the wholesale removal of 
judicial review, interest convergence seeks to rationalize decisions in those 
“hard cases” where doctrine and case outcome fail to align.37 
 
 25. See ELY, supra note 21, at 44–48. 
 26. See JEFFREY A. SEGALL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 231–35 (1993); see also Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules 
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 
784 (1983). 
 27. See ELY, supra note 21, at 44–48. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 1060, 1103–05. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Spann, Hypocrisy, supra note 17, at 560. 
 32. Robin West, Critical Legal Studies – The Missing Years, in NORMATIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 107, 166 (2011). 
 33. See id. 
 34. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE 
L.J. 997, 1007 (1985).  See also Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative 
Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473, 528 (1984) [hereinafter Spann, Veto]. 
 35. Spann, Veto, supra note 34, at 516. 
 36. See id. at 526. 
 37. See Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 523. 
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B.  Interest Convergence 
As a theoretical frame, interest convergence has a fascinating history and 
an even more interesting evolution as a paradigm transcending the bounds of 
its initial application.  Coined and crafted by the late Professor Derrick Bell in 
1980, interest convergence continues to be both celebrated and criticized, all 
the while remaining a highly debated and controversial theoretical model.38  
Used and evaluated by dozens of scholars in a variety of contexts, interest con-
vergence remains relevant and influential, outlasting other theories.39 
Inspired by Professor Herbert Wechsler’s critique of the Brown deci-
sion,40 Bell’s article rolled out a theoretical framework much in line with 
Wechsler’s need for a “principled appraisal” of government action.41  
Wechsler’s analysis “emphasize[d] the world as it is rather than how we might 
want it to be,” a tenet with which Bell very much agreed.42  With this, Bell 
offered to resolve Wechsler’s quandary regarding Brown, namely that the opin-
ion failed to rest on principled reasoning.43 
In his article, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,44 
Wechsler criticized the Brown Court for deciding the case without a basis in 
neutral principles.45  His primary criticism lay in the notion that courts “must 
be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in 
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate 
result that is achieved.”46  For Wechsler, courts are capable of engaging in a 
principled assessment of government action that exceeds a rigid historical in-
terpretation of constitutional provisions without becoming an activist court.47  
Weschler concluded that this type of reasoning was notably missing from the 
Brown decision, thereby calling into question the opinion’s legitimacy.48  
Wechsler reviewed and dismissed the prospect that Brown stood for the prop-
osition that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial line drawing in legis-
lation.49  He determined that the Brown Court must have supported its holding 
by finding that “racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the 
minority against whom it is directed; that is, the group that is not dominant 
politically and, therefore, does not make the choice involved.”50  Wechsler  
 38. See generally id. 
 39. See, e.g., id. 
 40. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1959). 
 41. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 520 (citing Wechsler, supra note 40, at 16). 
 42. Id. at 523. 
 43. See id. at 523–24. 
 44. See generally Wechsler, supra note 40. 
 45. See id. at 15. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 16. 
 48. See id. at 21–22. 
 49. See id. at 29–30. 
 50. Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
8
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found this reasoning untenable because it would require questioning the mo-
tives of the legislature.51  He then posited that the legal issue with segregation 
was a question of associational rights.  Wechsler reasoned that “if the freedom 
of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon 
those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.”52  Wechsler concluded his cri-
tique with a question: 
Given a situation where the state must practically choose between deny-
ing the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on 
those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for hold-
ing that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should 
prevail?53 
In response, Bell suggested that the normative principle of racial equality “un-
derlay” the decision in Brown.54  However, because most Americans did not 
regard this equality principle as a widespread social or political goal, interest 
convergence was the primary motivation of the Court for handing down a ra-
cially egalitarian decision.55 
1.  The Theory 
In his highly controversial and often-cited 1980 Harvard Law Review ar-
ticle, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
Professor Bell discussed the principle of “interest convergence” in depth.56  
The original intention in offering the theory was to advance a positivistic ex-
pression of a neutral principle that could explain U.S Supreme Court opinions 
in the school desegregation cases pre- and post-Brown.57  In its purest form, 
interest convergence provides that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial 
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites.”58  Thus, Bell perceived the civil rights reforms of the 1950s and 1960s 
not as noble acts representative of the American equality principle, but as 
changes made because they held political value to the white power structure.59  
For Bell, “[W]hite elites will tolerate or encourage racial advances for blacks 
only when such advances also promote [their own] self-interests.”60  He con-
cluded that the Fourteenth Amendment would not permit a judicial remedy 
 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 34. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 522. 
 55. Id. at 523. 
 56. See generally id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 524. 
 60. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, at xvii (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 2000). 
9
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providing real racial equality for blacks if such a remedy would threaten the 
dominant status of whites.61 
While acknowledging that there were whites motivated strictly by the 
equality principle, Bell explained the way in which the Brown decision re-
flected a convergence of interests.62  He offered three specific occurrences in 
political culture that could have influenced the Court’s ultimate decision.63  
First, Bell suggested that Brown helped bolster the international image of dem-
ocratic values during the Cold War.64  With communists choosing to highlight 
segregation in their propaganda, Brown helped legitimize the democratic rhet-
oric of equality and freedom.65  By mandating desegregation in public educa-
tion, Brown represented America’s commitment to equality on an international 
stage.66 
Second, Bell proposed that Brown supported America’s effort to convince 
blacks they were a recognized segment of society.67  At the time Brown was 
announced, blacks had fought in World War II against Nazi Germany.68  With 
whites fearful that blacks would be reluctant to serve in future armed conflicts, 
Brown articulated America’s promise of equality at home.69 
Bell’s third and final consideration was the potential economic gains from 
an industrialized South.70  State-sponsored segregation was preventing the 
South from shifting from a rural society to a more industrialized and profitable 
region.71  Whites interested in the potential gains from an industrialized South 
viewed segregation as an obstacle to economic progress.72  These three con-
cerns converged with the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality, coa-
lescing around the ideas that segregation was a barrier to progress and a con-
travention of the equality principle.73  Without the convergence of these inter-
ests, black interests would languish as they did for decades prior to Brown.74  
As Bell recognized, “[t]hese points may seem insufficient proof of self-interest 
leverage to produce a decision as important as Brown,” however, they are cited 
“to help assess and not to diminish” the Court’s decision.75 
Bell found this era of convergence short-lived, with the Court “increas-
ingly erect[ing] barriers to achieving the forms of racial balance relief it earlier 
 
 61. See Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 523. 
 62. See id. at 525. 
 63. Id. at 523–25. 
 64. See id. at 524. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 524–25. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at 525. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. at 523. 
 75. Id. at 525. 
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had approved.”76  He predicted retrenchment would likely follow an era of ad-
vancement.77  First, Brown II failed to require prompt desegregation of the na-
tion’s public schools.78  Furthermore, the Court’s attitude seemingly changed.  
Citing the Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman79 and Columbus 
Board of Education v. Penick,80 Bell discussed the additional requirement that 
plaintiffs must also prove intentional discrimination by school officials and that 
relief granted is limited to the harm proven.81  He also pointed to the decisions 
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education82 and Milliken v. 
Bradley,83 where the Court deferred to local government busing plans despite 
evidence of continued segregation.84  These opinions “elevated the concept of 
‘local autonomy’ to a ‘vital national tradition.’”85  In a later article, Bell con-
tended that the Court’s decision in Brown resulted in an interest divergence in 
subsequent Brown litigation.86 
Bell also declared Grutter v. Bollinger87 the “definitive example of [] 
[i]nterest-convergence.”88  With Grutter, a convergence of interests existed 
with both Fortune 500 companies and the military working to diversify their 
forces and the interests of racial minorities pursuing admission in elite law 
schools.89  While the Court upheld the Michigan Law School’s admission pro-
gram on constitutional grounds, Bell posited that the Court may have done so 
because the plan “minimizes the importance of race while offering maximum 
protection to whites and those aspects of society with which she [Grutter] iden-
tifies, she supported.”90  For Bell, “Once again, blacks and Hispanics are the 
 
 76. Id. at 527. 
 77. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current 
Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 13 (1976). 
 78. Brown II refers to Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 79. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 527 (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 
433 U.S. 406 (1977)). 
 80. Id. (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 499, 464 (1977)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 530 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 
31 (1971)). 
 83. Id. at 526 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1971)). 
 84. Id. at 526, 530. 
 85. Id. at 526 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 
(1977)). 
 86. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Inter-
ests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 478 (1976). 
 87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 88. Derrick A. Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 
(2003) [hereinafter Bell, Distractions]. 
 89. Id. at 1623. 
 90. Id. at 1624.  See also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 149 (2004) [hereinafter 
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS]. 
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fortuitous beneficiaries of a ruling that can and probably will change when 
other priorities assert themselves.”91 
Over time, Bell developed a phrase for Brown-type cases: “contradiction 
closing cases”:92 
That is, they narrow the gap between white and black rights that the 
framers wrote into the Constitution.  These cases serve as a shield 
against excesses in the exercise of white power, yet they bring about no 
real change in the status of blacks. . . . A decision may benefit some, 
but more importantly, it provides blacks and liberals with the sense that 
the system is not so bad after all.  The “contradiction closing” cases 
suggest that we can depend on the courts, if not for our salvation, then 
at least for the correction of racial outrages.93 
Bell suggested that the decisions in such cases transformed the Court into a 
type of “judicial monitor,” granting concessions depending on the “cost” to 
society.94  During eras of convergence, decisions in contradiction-closing cases 
became key to reaffirming America’s commitment to freedom, fairness, and 
equality. 
Developed in the search of neutral principles that serve to explain judicial 
activity in the school desegregation cases, interest convergence proved flexible 
enough to apply to other contexts.  It provides an assessment tool when trying 
to make sense of important constitutional decisions that lack principled guid-
ance from the Court.  However, the limitations of the theory do not go unno-
ticed. 
2.  The Critique 
The Northwestern Law Review recently published one of the most com-
prehensive and stimulating critiques of interest convergence.95  In Rethinking 
the Interest-Convergence Thesis,96 Professor Driver argued interest conver-
gence “is too often categorical where it should be nuanced and too often fo-
cused on continuity where it should acknowledge change.”97  In the article, he 
 
 91. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 90, at 151; Bell, Distractions, supra 
note 88, at 1624 (“[W]e could not obtain meaningful relief until policymakers perceived 
that the relief blacks sought furthered interests or resolved issues of more primary con-
cern.”). 
 92. Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 32 
(1985). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 33. 
 95. Driver, supra note 8, at 165. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 157. 
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presented “four analytical flaws” with the interest convergence paradigm, 
which he argued weakened the theory’s “persuasiveness.”98 
Driver’s first criticism is that the theory rests upon a far-reaching under-
standing of what exactly constitutes “black interest” and “white interest.”99  For 
Driver, the intra-racial complexities, conflicts, and nuances cannot be broken 
down into a singular “interest” in which that entire racial group concurs.100  The 
failure of Bell to define these terms confuses the dialogue and debates regard-
ing the meaning of the terms.101  Second, Driver asserts that interest conver-
gence fails to pay adequate homage to racial progress that has been made, such 
as the abandonment of “separate-but-equal” principles announced in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.102  While he acknowledged that the “conditions are far from per-
fect,” Driver contends that interest convergence does not consider that “as 
blacks and other people of color have received the dignitary effects tradition-
ally reserved for whites, it follows that whiteness, on its own, has decreased in 
value.”103  Third, Driver argues that interest convergence confers “insufficient 
agency” to two of the most important actors in the debate – black citizens and 
white judges.104  The theory “sharply discounts the capacity of black people to 
participate in their own uplift” and “diminishes the culpability of white judges 
who exercise their authority to maintain the existing racial hierarchy.”105  Fi-
nally, because interest convergence cannot be refuted, it supports judicial de-
cisions concerning racial equality.106  This is so because, according to Driver, 
the theory either argues that such decisions are essential compromises neces-
sary to “maintain white racism,” or the theory ignores the decisions alto-
gether.107  These flaws, in turn, lead to harmful consequences, such as limiting 
the menu of possible remedial strategies for black advancement108 and rein-
forcing the racial paranoia and conspiracy theories already prevalent in black 
communities.109 
Driver’s critique is both thought provoking and valuable.  However, it 
often over complicates the simplistic, while simultaneously simplifying the 
complex.  For example, while emphasizing that Bell failed to define “black 
interest” and “white interest,” Driver criticizes use of the terms as “overly 
 
 98. Id. at 156. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 166 (“Contrary to the notion advanced by the interest-convergence ide-
ology, however, there is no singular black agenda.”). 
 101. Id. at 156. 
 102. Id. at 170–73 (“While the goal of racial equality has certainly not yet been 
fully realized, the racial progress that has been made over the generations has dramati-
cally elevated the racial status of blacks.”). 
 103. Id. at 174–75. 
 104. Id. at 157. 
 105. Id. at 175. 
 106. Id. at 157. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 189. 
 109. Id. at 192–93. 
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broad conceptualization[s],” creating confusion in the discourse.110  He further 
points to intra-racial differences to demonstrate that there is “no singular black 
agenda.”111  Bell, however, did describe and explain the interests to which he 
was referring when using the terms “black interest” and “white interest.”  In 
the article, Bell was clear in his understanding that the “black interest” was in 
that of racial equality.112  Regarding “white interest,” Bell identified the three 
above-mentioned contextual concerns (the Cold War, domestic racial consid-
erations, and Southern industrialization) that formulated the “white interest” in 
reaffirming America’s commitment to equality.113  While Driver is surely right 
that there are critical and important intra-racial differences that preclude a con-
sensus on what exactly constitutes the “black agenda,” it is also surely right 
that racial equality, as a principle, is an interest of all blacks, as it serves as the 
constitutional foundation of their American citizenship. 
Driver simplifies the complicated in his discussion, critiquing Bell’s fo-
cus on racial problems as opposed to racial progress.114  To Driver, Bell’s fail-
ure to acknowledge racial gains diminishes the persuasiveness of the para-
digm.115  Driver points to Dred Scott116 and Plessy v. Ferguson117 in an effort 
to demonstrate that racial progress has been made.118  It is, unfortunately, not 
that simple.  While it is true that we, as a country, are not in the same place 
with race relations as we once were, it is also true that blacks are still lagging 
far behind their white counterparts in all areas of American life.119  Thus, the 
“racial progress” that Driver discusses must be measured relative to the gains 
made by whites over time.  Once that comparison is made, it is apparent that 
“[t]he difference in the condition of slaves in one of the gradual emancipation 
 
 110. Id. at 156. 
 111. Id. at 166. 
 112. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 523. 
 113. Id. at 524–25. 
 114. Driver, supra note 8, at 171–75. 
 115. Id. at 156–57. 
 116. Id. at 173 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856), superseded 
by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 117. Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1956)). 
 118. Id. at 172–73. 
 119. Lindsey Cook, U.S. Education: Still Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP.: DATA MINE (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:01 
AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/01/28/us-education-still-
separate-and-unequal (surveying the education gap between black and white children, 
the education funding gap between black and white schools, higher poverty rates among 
black children, and the college admission gap between black and white college enroll-
ment); Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps, STAN. CTR. FOR EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS, 
http://cepa.stanford.edu/educational-opportunity-monitoring-project/achievement-
gaps/race/; Lindsey Cook, Why Black Americans Die Younger, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP.: DATA MINE (Jan. 5, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-
mine/2015/01/05/black-americans-have-fewer-years-to-live-heres-why. 
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states and black people today is more of degree than of kind.”120  Nevertheless, 
Driver’s critique provides insight into possible ways to strengthen interest con-
vergence as a theoretical frame. 
3.  Use of the Frame 
The use of interest convergence as an analytical frame has since expanded 
beyond the realm of school desegregation.  Scholars interested in the black-
white binary continue to apply the frame to different legal developments.121  
Interest convergence is also utilized by nonblack racial groups, including Asian 
Americans122 and Latinos.123  For example, Professor Richard Delgado em-
ployed interest convergence to offer an explanation of the Court’s decision in 
Hernandez v. Texas.124  In Hernandez, the Court determined that the exclusion 
of persons of Mexican descent from jury service in a Texas county (where there 
was a substantial number of qualified people of Mexican descent) was a viola-
tion of equal protection.125  In explaining the case within the interest conver-
gence paradigm, Delgado pointed to three considerations that formulated the 
dominant interest, thus yielding a racially egalitarian decision in the case: the 
Cold War, dismal living conditions in Mexican communities, and communist 
threats in nearby Latin America.126  In the article, he underscored American 
domestic concerns and international affairs, highlighting the rise of Fidel Cas-
tro and Che Guevara, Joe McCarthy’s communist paranoia, and Latin Ameri-
can unrest as possible influences contributing to the interest of the dominant 
group.127 
Interest convergence has frequently been applied in contexts outside of 
race relations, including the First Amendment and employment discrimination 
contexts.128  For example, Professor Stephen Feldman utilized the frame to an-
alyze religious power in America vis-à-vis Supreme Court precedent.129  For 
 
 120. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Ra-
cial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 16 (1979); see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, 
AND AMERICAN LAW 211 (5th ed. 2004). 
 121. Morrison, supra note 8, at 1114–18; Wilig, supra note 8, at 1510; Cashin, su-
pra note 8, at 254–55. 
 122. Rhonda V. Magee, The Master’s Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to 
African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Dis-
course, 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 908–09 (1993) (using interest convergence to explain Con-
gress’s favorable response to the Japanese-American request for reparations). 
 123. Delgado, supra note 8, at 31–43; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476 
(1954). 
 124. Delgado, supra note 8, at 31–43.  The Court reversed Hernandez’s conviction.  
Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 480–82. 
 125. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 481. 
 126. Delgado, supra note 8, at 43–50. 
 127. Id. at 45. 
 128. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8, at 1764 (2003). 
 129. Feldman, supra note 8, at 871–72. 
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Feldman, the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the Establishment Clause is 
predictably determined by the dominant group’s favored religion: Christian-
ity.130  Only when the government attacks Christianity are “outgroup religions” 
able to receive concessions.131  Professor Cynthia Lee used interest conver-
gence as the lynchpin in establishing a “cultural defense” in criminal law that 
she coined “cultural convergence.”132  Cultural convergence is the idea that 
minority and immigrant cultural defense claims that are successfully intro-
duced as evidence at a criminal trial “are more likely to receive accommodation 
when there is convergence between their cultural norms and American cultural 
norms.”133 
This Article employs interest convergence to gain a basic understanding 
of the Court’s right to counsel decisions.  In identifying eras of convergence 
and divergence, this Article will demonstrate the way in which interest conver-
gence may be used to explain trends in the Court’s jurisprudence on this topic.  
By understanding the prominent interests of the dominant group and the sub-
ordinate group at the times of these decisions, a parallel may be drawn between 
the trajectory of the Court’s interpretive approach and the larger political cul-
ture. 
III.  CONVERGENCE: POWELL AND GIDEON 
Powell and Gideon are both celebrated and firmly entrenched preceden-
tial cases.134  The decisions are often analyzed and admired for their pro-
nounced commitment to the principle of equality.135  While they represent so-
cial and racial progress, it is important to consider the context in which they 
were decided.  Application of the interest convergence paradigm reveals that 
these cases were contradiction-closing cases decided in times of great friction, 
both domestically and internationally. 
In an era remembered for the Great Depression, the Ku Klux Klan 
(“KKK”), and the rise of communism, Powell was celebrated by those in the 
dominant group who found value in a national proclamation of fairness, as well 
as those in policymaking positions capable of understanding the political ad-
vances at home and abroad that would follow a reaffirmation of America’s le-
gal commitment to equality.136  With the number of Americans in poverty 
growing each day and racial violence running rampart across the South, the 
 
 130. Id. at 871. 
 131. Id. at 871–72. 
 132. Lee, supra note 8, at 939. 
 133. Id. at 914. 
 134. See Nannette Jolivette Brown, 75th Anniversary of Powell v. Alabama Com-
memorated, 56 LA. B.J. 19, 19 (2008); Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 113, 115 (2012). 
 135. See Brown, supra note 134, at 19; Dripps, supra note 134, at 115. 
 136. See Brown, supra note 134, at 19. 
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country was in dire need of an official declaration reasserting America’s fidel-
ity to equality.137  Thus, the outcome in Powell cannot be read without some 
thought of the decision’s value to the dominant group. 
In 1932, the Court decided Powell v. Alabama.138  A consequence of the 
infamous Scottsboro Boys trials, this case was elevated to international status 
by communist propaganda, exposing American racism and further exacerbat-
ing racial tensions.139  The facts of Powell are well documented.140  In that case, 
nine black teenagers were charged with raping two white women in Ala-
bama.141  They were swiftly convicted and sentenced to death.142  The convic-
tions were appealed on the grounds that the defendants were deprived of a fair 
trial, counsel, and an impartial jury.143  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certi-
orari and declared: 
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, 
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ig-
norance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the 
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law . . . .144 
The Court concluded that the trial court erred in its failure to provide the de-
fendants with “reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel,” as well its 
failure to make an “effective appointment of counsel.”145  Because the Sixth 
Amendment only applied to the federal courts at the time, the Court decided 
the case on due process grounds.146  It concluded that the defendants were not 
accorded the right to counsel and this, in turn, infringed upon the due process 
guarantee of a fair trial articulated in the Fourteenth Amendment.147  Two of 
the most conservative Justices, Justices Butler and McReynolds, dissented.148  
They argued that the defendants received an adequate and fair trial, and, in the  
 137. See id. 
 138. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 139. The “Scottsboro Boys” is a famous American story.  See generally JAMES 
HASKINS, THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS (1994); DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY 
OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1979). 
 140. HASKINS, supra note 139, at 13–22. 
 141. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49. 
 142. Id. at 50. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 71. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 66. 
 147. Id. at 71.  Six years later in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that all defendants 
in a federal criminal prosecution, including those unable to secure or employ an attor-
ney, have a right to counsel, unless specifically waived.  304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938).  
However, the Court first declined to incorporate the right to appointed counsel to the 
states in Betts v. Brady.  316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 148. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73–77 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
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event they had not, the principles of federalism dictated the Court refrain from 
intervening.149 
First, Powell demonstrated to the world that the United States was firm in 
its commitment to equality.  Communism was encroaching on the natural order 
of the domestic political situation, and Joseph Stalin, with his brutal method of 
leading the communist movement, reigned supreme.150  Additionally, the Great 
Depression brought with it a validation of the communist belief that the certain 
death of capitalism was gradually being realized through the creation of a class-
conscious proletariat.151  At this time, communists were extremely active on 
the civil rights front, and the Scottsboro case provided the perfect platform to 
expose the United States, and, therefore, capitalist societies, as offering its cit-
izens only a shallow commitment to equality.152  In the face of intense interna-
tional and domestic scrutiny, Powell stood as a pronouncement that constitu-
tional safeguards were granted to everyone, irrespective of class and race.  The 
opinion was instantly hailed a landmark case in news outlets.153  In effect, the 
decision gave America credibility in its demonstration that the democratic sys-
tem of government promises to value the equality principle.  Such a pronounce-
ment by America’s highest court satisfied the dominant group’s interest in re-
habilitating its image abroad.154 
The decision also sent a message to the poor that the U.S. Constitution 
will protect the rights of citizens, regardless of wealth (and race).  The New 
York stock market crashed in 1929, ushering in the Great Depression.155  By 
1932, U.S. manufacturing output fell to 54% of its 1929 level.156  Much of the 
country was unemployed, with blacks complaining that they were “the last [to 
be] hired and the first [to be] fired.”157  The financial strain and intense despair 
suffered by the American poor would not begin to lift until well into President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Administration.  The declaration that everyone be 
afforded equal treatment under the law despite socio-economic standing but-
tressed the position that the United States remained loyal to the principle of 
equality. 
Finally, Powell also offered a federal statement on the issue of race rela-
tions.  During this era, racial anxieties increased with the expansion of white 
supremacy and Jim Crow policies.158  Reaching its peak membership of five 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. CARTER, supra note 139, at 161–73. 
 151. Id. at 137–38. 
 152. Id. at 61–73, 133–73. 
 153. Id. at 163. 
 154. See Feldman, supra note 8, at 854. 
 155. See SHARON HALEY, THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY 246 
(1992). 
 156. Id. at 234. 
 157. William A. Sundstrom, Last Hired, First Fired? Unemployment and Urban 
Black Workers During the Great Depression, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 415, 420 (1992).  
HALEY, supra note 155, at 246. 
 158. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 101–02 (1955). 
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million in the mid-1920s, the newly revived KKK terrorized the South and ex-
tended its aim to include racial and religious minorities.159  Jim Crow was also 
in full effect during this time.  Statewide prohibitions on race mixing permeated 
the South, with state and local ordinances requiring Jim Crow sports, parks, 
and modes of transportation.160  For example, at the Democratic National Con-
vention in Houston, Texas, in 1928, black attendees were restricted to the rear 
of the balcony, separated by chicken wire.161  While often excluded from the 
dominant group, Powell symbolically ensured that poor, black Americans were 
not exempt from constitutional protection.162  This served the dominant group’s 
interest by demonstrating to the world that America was a country predicated 
upon the principles of equality and fairness.163  Although the Scottsboro Boys 
ultimately suffered a decades-long battle for freedom, as a contradiction-clos-
ing case, Powell served to quell the sense that justice was different for the sub-
ordinate group, while simultaneously guaranteeing the right to counsel to the 
poor, albeit in capital cases.164  For the dominant group, Powell stood as a sym-
bol that America remained committed to egalitarian principles despite com-
munist propaganda to the contrary.165  In sum, the decision sent a broader mes-
sage that the Court would step in during times of unequal treatment. 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court faced similar pressures.  Gideon in-
corporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and further extended that 
right to indigent defendants in all criminal prosecutions, federal and state.166  
In overruling Betts v. Brady,167 the Court set itself on a new trajectory in con-
stitutionally ensuring that criminal prosecutions accord with due process.168  In 
reaching its conclusion, the Gideon Court quoted Powell extensively.169  The  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 104. 
 161. Chronology of Black Republicans and Democratic Leanings, MINORITY 
OPPORTUNITY NEWS 21 (May 1998), http://northdallasgazette.com/wordpress/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/02/Vol.-7-No.-5-May-1998.pdf. 
 162. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
 163. See Feldman, supra note 8, at 854, 867. 
 164. See HASKINS, supra note 139. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963). 
 167. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.  For 
the Court, the Betts opinion’s refusal to extend the right to counsel to state court pros-
ecutions was disingenuous at best.  With plenty of prior precedent on the subject, the 
Betts Court should have discovered the critical nature of the right to counsel and the 
necessity of defense counsel during criminal prosecutions. 
 168. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339. 
 169. Id. at 344–45 (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if 
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.  If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is 
good or bad.  He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.  Left without the aid of coun-
sel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both 
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Court recognized the need to yet again promote the equality principle in the 
right to counsel context. 
The Court decided Douglas v. California the same day it decided Gid-
eon.170  In Douglas, the Court held that indigent defendants are entitled to rep-
resentation in criminal appeals granted as of right.171  However, the case was 
decided on equal protection grounds as opposed to right to counsel.  The Court 
stated: 
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment 
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of coun-
sel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling 
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a 
preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to 
shift for himself.172 
With this, the Court further entrenched the relationship between the right to 
counsel and the equality principle.  By explicitly acknowledging unfairness in 
a process that predicates the assistance and skill of counsel on an ability to pay, 
the Court insinuated that equal protection was an alternative constitutional con-
duit to indigent defense.173 
The recognition of Gideon as a victory for the poor and minority commu-
nities is well deserved.  It changed the procedural and substantive landscape of 
criminal prosecutions and is legally treated as a “watershed” decision with ret-
roactive application.174  But there is a different understanding of Gideon, which 
takes into account the socio-political context of the decision.  Two primary 
issues confronted the United States at the time Gideon was litigated: the Civil 
Rights Movement and the right of communism.  Together, these issues created 
the need for a pronouncement of the equality principle.  Gideon served as a 
contradiction-closing case that promoted that interest. 
 
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a per-
fect one.  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him.  Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.” (quoting Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))). 
 170. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 353 (1963). 
 171. Id. at 357–58. 
 172. Id. 
 173. However, this intimation was short lived, with the Court finding no right to 
appointed counsel in discretionary appeals in Ross v. Moffitt in 1974.  417 U.S. 600, 
610 (1974). 
 174. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
INVESTIGATION 26–27 (2008). 
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Gideon was decided in March of 1963.175  Described as the “high point 
of the Civil Rights Movement,”176 the year commenced with an inaugural ad-
dress by the Governor of Alabama, George Wallace, proclaiming, “In the name 
of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust 
and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, 
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.”177  Although Brown ordered the 
desegregation of public schools in 1954, only seventeen schools in the South 
were desegregated, demonstrating the South’s disregard for the civil rights of 
blacks.178  By 1963, it was absolutely clear that the complaints and protests of 
southern blacks had morphed into a mass social movement spanning across the 
country.179  Martin Luther King, Jr. was touring the country promoting racial 
equality, while Malcolm X was emerging as a leader in the more militant Na-
tion of Islam.180  In 1963, the Civil Rights Movement was slowly morphing 
into the War on Poverty, linking the plight of blacks with poor whites.181  In 
addition, President John F. Kennedy was considering the idea of delivering a 
civil rights bill to Congress.182 
It was no secret that southern states used the criminal justice system as a 
vehicle for controlling the activities of civil rights activists at the time of Gid-
eon.183  While it is estimated that approximately twenty thousand people were 
arrested between 1961 and 1963, fifteen thousand of those people were arrested 
in 1963 alone.184  Failing to explicitly incorporate the right to counsel and ex-
tend that right to the poor would continue to result in unreasonable arrests and 
kangaroo court convictions for not only the poor and black communities, but 
also activists and intellectuals.  Without such protections, a mishap on the part 
of the South could potentially ignite the fury of the more militant and aggres-
sive civil rights groups such as Malcolm X’s Nation of Islam, adding a further 
taint to America’s international image. 
 
 175. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963). 
 176. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 37 (2010). 
 177. Wallace Quotes, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/wallace/sfea-
ture/quotes.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
 178. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY 632 (1944). 
 179. ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 37. 
 180. TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-1965 
(1998) [hereinafter BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE].  See also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING 
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-1963 (1988). 
 181. ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 39. 
 182. Id. at 38–39. 
 183. BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE, supra note 180, at 482–85 (discussing the jailing of 
Freedom Riders in Mississippi). 
 184. MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990, at 69 (1991). 
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In 1963, the United States was also intensely engaged in the Cold War.185  
The early 1960s marked the era of nuclear alarms testing, bringing with it a 
deep sense of fear of communism within the ranks of the American govern-
ment.186  The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the United States and the Soviet 
Union to the brink of nuclear war in the fall of 1962, demonstrating the strength 
and proximity of communism to America.  Images of white police hosing down 
black citizens did not fare well for the United States.187  News reports of out-
rageous racial injustices in the United States called into question the govern-
ment’s fidelity to espoused democratic principles.  This served as communist 
ammunition in the Cold War battle for Third World ideological allegiance. 
With Gideon, the Court was achieving more than just answering a consti-
tutional question by extending Sixth Amendment protections to the poor.  It 
was reaffirming its commitment to the equality principle, just as it had done in 
Powell.  Equality was now constitutionally mandated through the abstract guar-
antee of counsel to the poor.  The Court’s opinion served the interests of the 
dominant power structure similarly to the way Powell served those interests; it 
provided the dominant group with legal backing for the political rhetoric it es-
poused of freedom and equality in Cold War battleground countries.  It further 
demonstrated America’s continued commitment to equal treatment across the 
socio-economic spectrum.  Gideon thus added support and integrity to the idea 
that the country was confronting domestic social justice issues and seemingly 
making progress.  Furthermore, the egalitarian values espoused in the opinion 
fell in line with America’s stated position on fairness and equality.  In the strug-
gle to attract Cold War allies, such a pronouncement would be hard to ignore. 
While these points may seem like inadequate evidence of a self-interested 
pull to produce the decisions in Powell and Gideon, they are significant to the 
assessment of the Court’s statement on equality because Justices do not deter-
mine cases in a vacuum.  Instead, they make decisions within the contemporary 
political culture and bring with them their own values and interests.  Powell 
and Gideon are no doubt constitutional victories for the poor.  However, they 
are also a study in judicial decision-making and represent contradiction-closing 
cases in that they are examples of how judicial outcomes coincided with the 
socio-political climate at the time.  Both of these decisions were issued when 
the country was faced with domestic and international unrest threatening to 
disrupt the social order.  The interests of the dominant group and the subordi-
nate group converged on the issue of the right to counsel and indigent defense 
because it emphasized a value that supported both constituents’ interests: the 
equality principle. 
At home, Powell and Gideon demonstrated the Court’s fidelity to equal 
treatment.  While state legislatures and the Executive Branch were seemingly 
trampling on the rights of the poor and minorities, the Court served as the 
 
 185. TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 137 (1987). 
 186. Id. at 63, 91. 
 187. Id. at 137–43. 
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keeper of civil liberties.188  In the abstract, Powell and Gideon were understood 
as wins for social justice, implicitly planting a seed that meaningful gains were 
on the horizon.  On the ground, equality for poor and minority communities 
meant that that they would be accorded the rights bestowed on all American 
citizens when facing the criminal justice system.  Abroad, Powell and Gideon 
may have played a symbolic role in the reaffirmation of the equality principle 
necessary to attract allies during the Cold War and preserve national security.  
As the debate continues regarding whether the outcomes of these cases were 
realized, there can be no doubt that without them, thousands of indigent crim-
inal defendants would be without lawyers for one of the most important events 
of an individual’s life: a criminal prosecution.  The convergence of the interests 
that led to Powell and Gideon soon faded with the arrival of the dominant 
group’s backlash from the progressive policies and politics of the 1960s. 
IV.  RETRENCHMENT, DIVERGENCE, AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
Interest convergence understands that eras of convergence are short-lived 
and followed by a retrenchment manifesting itself in restrictive interpretations 
of reformist policies aimed at enforcing civil liberties.189  After the social 
movements of the 1960s and early 1970s, American culture underwent a con-
servative revolution, which transformed the way constitutional freedoms and 
rights were understood.  A doctrinal reading of the decisions in Strickland and 
Hill demonstrates a conservative approach to constitutional interpretation.  
Alone, these cases are a sound exercise in strict construction.  Together, they 
represent a deviation from the Court’s earlier right to counsel jurisprudence.  
Why the change?  The decision to break with the Court’s earlier interpretation 
of the right to counsel cannot be understood without considering the values and 
interests of the dominant group.  The interest in stopping the encroaching civil 
rights of the poor and minority governed the ideology of the dominant group 
in the 1980s, as such gains could upset the social order.  With Soviet Russia no 
longer an international threat, the dominant group was preoccupied with ad-
vancing the conservative agenda, which primarily consisted of promoting fed-
eralism and individual responsibility.190  In this section, I argue that the con-
servative agenda prompted a divergence of interests between the dominant 
group and the subordinate group.  While this divergence permeated American 
culture, the Court’s jurisprudence adjusted its frame when analyzing right to 
counsel cases and moved away from the rights-centered language in Powell 
and Gideon. 
 
 188. Id. at 137. 
 189. Bell, Brown, supra note 7, at 526. 
 190. Elisabeth Zoller, Citizenship After the Conservative Movement, 20 IND. J. 
GLOB. STUD. 279, 298–299 (2013). 
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In May of 1984, the Court handed down Strickland v. Washington.191  
Strickland firmly established that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guar-
anteed the right to effective assistance of counsel.192  However, the two-step 
test the Court crafted to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel set 
an extremely high threshold for defendants to meet. 
In Strickland, the respondent was indicted in Florida for kidnapping and 
murder.193  Although he was appointed “an experienced criminal lawyer to rep-
resent him” and counsel advised him against confessing, the respondent con-
fessed to the crimes, waived his right to a jury trial, pled guilty to three capital 
murder charges, and waived his right to an advisory jury at his capital sentenc-
ing hearing.194  In preparation for sentencing, respondent’s counsel conducted 
a minimal investigation, as he claimed to be experiencing a sense of “hopeless-
ness” caused by respondent’s failure to heed his advice.195  The respondent was 
sentenced to death and subsequently appealed claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel.196  The Court granted certiorari and held that respondent’s counsel 
was not ineffective within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to 
the right to effective assistance of counsel.197 
Strickland provided the Court with an opportunity to craft a constitutional 
test by which lower courts could evaluate Sixth Amendment claims of inade-
quate representation.  In the opinion, the Court set forth a two-pronged test 
used to evaluate ineffectiveness claims.  The threshold question is “whether 
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial pro-
cess that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”198  The 
first prong of the test requires an assessment of attorney performance, while 
 
 191. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984). 
 192. Id. at 686–95.  In the assessment of attorney performance, a “defendant must 
show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  
Id. at 688.  Courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances using “[p]revailing 
norms of practice” to judge the performance at issue.  Id.  In Strickland, the Court 
looked to ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, with a specific focus on “Defense Func-
tion.”  Id.  Present in the analysis is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell 
within the range of “reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 689.  A court reviewing 
the case must adjudge counsel’s performance at the time of the conduct at issue, with 
defendants pointing specifically to acts or omissions of counsel that were unreasonable.  
Id. at 690.  The prejudice prong of the test requires that a defendant demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  There is also a presumption 
that the judge and/or jury acted in accordance with the law, and this prong, too, requires 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.  Id. at 694–95. 
 193. Id. at 671–72. 
 194. Id. at 672. 
 195. Id. at 672–73. 
 196. Id. at 678. 
 197. Id. at 700. 
 198. Id. at 687. 
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the second prong considers whether counsel’s performance prejudiced the de-
fendant.199  Although Strickland was decided in 1984, the Court would not find 
a valid ineffective assistance of counsel challenge until 2000, demonstrating 
the difficulty in meeting the high threshold showing the Court established.200 
One year after Strickland, the Court decided Hill v. Lockhart.201  In Hill, 
the Court expanded the reach of Strickland, holding that the Strickland test was 
appropriate to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context 
of guilty plea challenges.202  In Hill, the petitioner pled guilty to first-degree 
murder and theft.203  The petitioner received the State’s recommended sentence 
and signed a “plea statement” that included a provision whereby the petitioner 
asserted that he understood his rights and voluntarily pled guilty.204  On appeal, 
the petitioner claimed that his court-appointed attorney provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel.205  According to the petitioner, his attorney failed to in-
form him that as a second-time offender he would be mandated to serve half of 
his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.206  Instead, petitioner claimed 
that defense counsel told him that he would have to serve one-third of his sen-
tence before being eligible.207  In assessing ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the Court concluded that petitioner failed to establish the prejudice prong of 
the Strickland test.  First, although the advice itself was erroneous, it was not 
prejudicial.208  Moreover, because petitioner did not claim that if defense coun-
sel had accurately advised him of parole eligibility he would have insisted on 
trial and not pled guilty, the Strickland Court determined that petitioner failed 
on the prejudice prong.209 
The decisions in Strickland and Hill offered proof that the Court was 
abandoning an expansionist interpretation of constitutional liberties and effect-
ing a regression on its earlier emphasis of the significance of fairness and equal-
ity in constitutional jurisprudence.  Neither in Strickland nor Hill was there any 
mention of equality, equal rights, or the principle of equality.  While the 1980s 
witnessed a retrenchment from gains made during the earlier social move-
ments, the equality principle was drowned out by calls for an end to affirmative 
action and tougher criminal laws.210  Conservative principles provided a plat-
form to encourage personal responsibility and accountability, translating into a 
phasing out of egalitarian policies.  Conservatism manifested itself in a variety 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000). 
 201. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 55–60 (1985). 
 202. Id. at 58–59. 
 203. Id. at 53. 
 204. Id. at 54. 
 205. Id. at 54–55. 
 206. Id. at 55. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 60. 
 209. Id. 
 210. ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 45–50. 
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of contexts, including higher education, socio-economic opportunities, and pe-
nal policy. 
First, subtle conservative rhetoric framed race relations as a contest be-
tween hardworking whites and worthless blacks, spurring anti-affirmative ac-
tion sentiment.  Regents of University of California v. Bakke211 exemplified the 
uncertainty within the political American body concerning the way race was to 
inform the current socio-legal order.  In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected U.C. 
Davis’s affirmative action program, asserting that although the school’s admis-
sions program articulated a compelling interest in the need for diversity, it 
failed to narrowly tailor the method to achieve that interest.212  Also at this 
time, big business and conservative lobbying groups advocating anti-affirma-
tive action legislation successfully gained momentum, resulting in the later re-
peal of a number of affirmative action policies in the 1990s.213 
Second, the country was experiencing a recession that included over sev-
enty bank failures, the savings and loan crisis, and high unemployment due to 
corporate outsourcing of manufacturing jobs.214  While the poor, as a whole, 
suffered devastating setbacks, urban black communities were more severely 
impacted.215  Poor whites and blacks competed for manufacturing jobs, pro-
ducing a further division within the subordinate group.  In the 1970s, over half 
of all blacks working in urban areas held blue-collar jobs.216  By 1987, the 
employment rate of black men in industrial occupations was 28%.217 
Third, the introduction of crack-cocaine in the illicit drug market allowed 
conservatives the opportunity to gain support for the war on drugs.  Crack was 
presented as a “black drug” with the potential to corrupt white suburbia, result-
ing in a further divergence of interests between the dominant group and racial 
minorities.218  Finally, conservative propaganda birthed the “Welfare 
Queen.”219  Carefully framed in race-neutral terms, conservative rhetoric prop-
agated images of poor, lazy, black women with multiple illegitimate children 
living off of hard working, blue-collar, white tax dollars.220  The resulting back-
lash exacerbated the “us versus them” division not only between the dominant 
group and the subordinate group, but also within the subordinate group, pitting 
working whites against blacks. 
 
 211. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 212. Id. at 314–15. 
 213. ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 45–50. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 50. 
 216. Id. at 50–51 (citing WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE 
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 30 (1997)). 
 217. WILSON, supra note 216, at 30. 
 218. Roland G. Fryer et al., Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact, ECON. 
INQUIRY 1, 6–7 (2006), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/fhlm_crack_co-
caine_0.pdf. 
 219. See generally KAARYN GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC 
ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011). 
 220. Id. at 36. 
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/9
2017] RINGING THE BELL 159 
Strickland and Hill also advanced the conservative agenda by demonstrat-
ing that the Court would no longer provide constitutional refuge to the subor-
dinate group in the context of criminal procedure.  With the “tough on crime” 
strategy in full force, criminal defendants faced a conservative Court with little 
regard for Warren Court policies.  On October 14, 1982, President Ronald 
Reagan declared a “War on Drugs” in an era where fewer than 2% of Ameri-
cans believed drug use was the most important issue facing the country.221  
Having a Republican majority in the Senate and a Republican President, con-
servatives established a number of punitive penal measures, while simultane-
ously defunding or repealing social programs for the poor.222  The ninety-ninth 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.223  The leg-
islation was the first comprehensive overhaul of the federal criminal code since 
the 1930s.224  The 1984 legislation included the Sentencing Reform Act225 and 
the Armed Career Criminal Act.226  Four years later, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988227 would reinstitute the death penalty for major federal drug felonies 
and murder,228 while simultaneously increasing criminal sanctions for mariju-
ana-related offenses.229  The legislation and the accompanying practices en-
acted during the War on Drugs substantially contributed to the establishment 
 
 221. Julian Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime and Criminal Justice, in 16 CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 129 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992). 
 222. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1762, 98 
Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A.); Housing and 
Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, H.R. 1, 98th Congress (repealing the authorization 
of Section 8, the federal housing program subsidizing the majority of federal housing 
program recipients).  See also David E. Rosenbaum, Reagan Insists Budget Cuts Are 
Way to Reduce Deficit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1986), http://www.ny-
times.com/1986/01/08/us/reagan-insists-budget-cuts-are-way-to-reduce-deficit.html. 
 223. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, § 1762. 
 224. See Crime Control Acts, chs. 299–304, 48 Stat. 780, 780–83 (1934) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A.).  Congress codified a number of fed-
eral crimes, including crimes related to assaulting or killing federal officers, frauds 
committed against banks, interstate kidnapping, and crimes defined for the purpose of 
administration in the federal prisons.  Id.  The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 101, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.A.) did not focus on creating federal crimes.  Recognizing that 
crime is primarily a “state and local” problem, the legislation provided funding oppor-
tunities for states that developed comprehensive crime plans in their jurisdictions.  Id. 
 225. The Sentencing Reform Act included mandatory federal sentencing guidelines 
and severe penalties for drug-related offenses.  Comprehensive Crime Control Act, § 
1762. 
 226. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2017).  If a felon has two or more prior predicate 
felonies which constitute “a violent felony” or a “serious” drug crime, the minimum 
sentence is fifteen years in prison with a maximum of life imprisonment.  Id. 
 227. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 1001, 102 Stat. 4181 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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of a criminal justice system with the highest incarceration rate in the world, 
with its prisons comprised of primarily poor and disproportionately minority 
people.  To fund this “war,” the budgets and spending of federal law enforce-
ment skyrocketed.  In the early 1980s, the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(“DEA”) antidrug spending grew from $86 million to over $1 billion.230  The 
FBI budget increased eleven times the amount provided for in 1980: from $8 
million to $95 million in 1984.231  Strickland and Hill helped ensure those dol-
lars were well spent by closing doctrinal loopholes that would allow criminals 
constitutional relief. 
Prior to Reagan’s first presidential election, America was experiencing a 
conservative backlash to the progressive gains made during the Civil Rights 
Movement and the War on Poverty.232  Electing Reagan represented the dom-
inant culture’s leaning toward more conservative values and interests.  While 
actively resisting policies grounded in equality, specifically racial equality such 
as busing and affirmative action, conservatives reconstructed America’s under-
standing of civil rights and the equality principle.233  Issues regarding crime 
and cases concerning criminal procedure produced fruitful opportunities to em-
ploy conservative interpretations to otherwise progressive policies.  Strickland 
and Hill represented retrenchment from the more liberal interpretative style of 
the Court in Powell and Gideon.  In employing a narrow approach to interpre-
tation and a seemingly strong fidelity to stare decisis, the Court was implicitly 
promoting conservative values and interests in personal responsibility and ac-
countability.  Equality was never mentioned in either opinion, thus removing 
the concept from the analysis and the idea from the jurisprudential vernacular 
in the Sixth Amendment context.  Thus, equality, as a recognized constitutional 
principle, was neglected. 
By assessing possible external considerations that factor into judicial de-
cision-making, the interest convergence analysis reveals that the Court’s re-
trenchment from emphasizing egalitarian principles paralleled the conservative 
backlash in the larger political culture.  When considering the socio-political 
climate at the time, Strickland and Hill are to be expected.  The break with the 
Court’s strong fidelity to the principle of equality reflected in Powell and Gid-
eon was noticeably absent in Strickland and Hill, with those cases focusing 
more on presumptions and definitions than the equality principle.  This stark 
divergence of interests between the dominant group and the subordinate group 
continued into the twenty-first century, until problems in plea bargaining pro-
duced an opportunity to reconsider the understanding of the right to counsel. 
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V.  CONVERGENCE AND THE PLEA BARGAINING TRILOGY 
The divergence of interests in the 1980s and 1990s played a significant 
role in shaping today’s justice system.  Conservative criminal policies from the 
divergence led to an explosion of the prison population, with the incarceration 
rate quadrupling between 1980 and 2003.234  In 2008, one in one hundred adults 
in America was behind bars,235 and one in thirty-one was under some form of 
custodial supervision.236  While criminal courts across the nation experienced 
difficulty with the volume of criminal prosecutions, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys faced pressure to quickly resolve cases by plea bargain.237  The prac-
tice of plea bargaining, which the Court had never constitutionally acknowl-
edged as an official part of the criminal process, took on a life of its own, 
prompting new constitutional questions concerning the right to counsel.238  No 
longer able to ignore the doctrinal questions related to the realities of plea bar-
gaining, the Court granted certiorari in three cases: Padilla, Frye, and Lafler.  
In those cases, the Court issued arguably pragmatic decisions, providing a 
baseline understanding of the constitutional protections afforded criminal de-
fendants during the plea process.239 
Padilla v. Kentucky changed the landscape in that it shed light on the 
shadow system of plea negotiations.  In Padilla, the petitioner pled guilty to 
drug charges related to the alleged transportation of a large amount of mariju-
ana in Kentucky and was ordered to be deported.240  The petitioner was a native 
of Honduras but was a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 
forty years and served in the U.S. Armed Forces during Vietnam.241  He con-
tended that during discussions with defense counsel, he was assured that a con-
viction of the drug-related charges would not result in deportation.242  He fur-
ther claimed that had he known that such deportation consequences existed and 
 
 234. Vincent Schiraldi et al., Poor Prescription: The Costs of Imprisoning Drug 
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were mandatory upon conviction, he would have insisted on going to trial.243  
With this, Padilla alleged a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim based on the erroneous advice from his attorney.244  Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Stevens agreed with the petitioner, finding deficient performance 
but leaving the issue of prejudice resulting from the misinformation provided 
to petitioner by defense counsel to the lower courts to decide.245 
In Padilla, the Court did two important things.  First, the Court declared 
that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for pur-
poses of the Sixth Amendment,” requiring the effective assistance of coun-
sel.246  Prior to Padilla, the Court refrained from recognizing a Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel during plea bargaining.  The constitutional reach of the 
right to counsel during the plea process was premised upon a vague statement 
that there existed a general right to counsel prior to entering a formal guilty 
plea.247  Problems concerning effective counsel were largely limited to issues 
concerning the waiver of constitutional rights in a plea agreement as opposed 
to the effective assistance of counsel during the plea negotiation process.248  
Any emphasis the Court placed on the critical role counsel played in the fair 
administration of justice was offered in dicta.249  It was not until Padilla that 
the Court unequivocally thrust Sixth Amendment protections into the plea ne-
gotiation process. 
Second, the Court’s opinion recognized criminal defendants facing pos-
sible deportation as a demographic “least able to represent themselves.”250  By 
acknowledging this group as such, the Court touched on equality, implicitly 
injecting the principle into the right to counsel discussion.  Never before had 
the Court intervened in the actual plea bargaining negotiation process.  And 
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fense counsel to advise her client regarding the deportation consequences of a criminal 
conviction.  Id. at 381. 
 247. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).  See also Waley v. Johnston, 
316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942). 
 248. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (stating that “[p]rior to trial 
an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of 
the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed 
opinion as to what plea should be entered”). 
 249. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 118–19 (1955) (a case involving a plea of 
guilty with Court discussing due process violation “where the circumstances show that 
his rights could not have been fairly protected without counsel”); Moore v. Michigan, 
355 U.S. 155, 159 (1957) (in a case involving a guilty plea entered without counsel, the 
Court held that “petitioner’s case falls within that class in which the intervention of 
counsel, unless intelligently waived by the accused, is an essential element of a fair 
hearing”); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961) (holding that when one 
pleads guilty without counsel to a capital charge, prejudice results and the conviction 
must be reversed). 
 250. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370–71. 
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when the Court did intervene, it did so on behalf of a group “least able to rep-
resent themselves.”251 
Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper were decided in 2012.  While Frye 
set the test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims during plea negotia-
tions,252 Lafler discussed remedies.253  The main issue in Frye was “whether 
defense counsel has the duty to communicate the terms of a formal offer to 
accept a plea on terms and conditions that may result in a lesser sentence, a 
conviction on lesser charges, or both.”254  The Court answered in the affirma-
tive, concluding that when defense counsel failed to communicate an offer to 
his client, he failed to provide effective assistance of counsel within the mean-
ing of the Sixth Amendment.255  In doing so, the Court recognized that plea 
bargains are “central” to the administration of justice.256  The Court asserted 
that “defense counsel [has] responsibilities in the plea bargain process, respon-
sibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the 
Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages.”257  For 
the Court, the failure to recognize this reality would in effect gut much of the 
Sixth Amendment’s meaning because “ours ‘is for the most part a system of 
pleas, not a system of trials.’”258  In order to remain loyal to the constitutional 
imperative of the Sixth Amendment, the Court demonstrated an appreciation 
of the role plea bargaining plays in the justice system.259 
 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012). 
 253. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). 
 254. Frye, 566 U.S. at 145.  In Missouri v. Frye, respondent Galin Frye was charged 
with driving with a revoked license in August of 2007.  Id. at 138.  The prosecutor sent 
Frye’s defense counsel a letter in which two offers were made.  Id.  The first offer 
required Frye to plead guilty to a felony charge in exchange for the State recommending 
a three-year sentence with Frye serving ten days in jail as “shock time” and no recom-
mendation on probation.  Id. at 138–39.  The second offer would reduce the felony 
charge to a misdemeanor with the State recommending a ninety-day jail term.  Id.  The 
letter further stated that both offers would expire on December 28, 2007.  Id. at 139.  
Defense counsel failed to advise Frye that the offers were made, and they expired with-
out any discussion between Frye and his lawyer.  Id.  Frye pled guilty to the Class D 
felony charge with no plea agreement between himself and the State.  Id.  The prose-
cutor, however, recommended a three-year sentence with ten days served in prison and 
no recommendation regarding probation.  Id.  The judge sentenced Frye to three years 
in prison.  Id.  Frye filed for post-conviction relief in state court, contending that his 
lawyer’s failure to inform him of the plea offers denied him effective assistance of 
counsel.  Id.  Undergoing the Strickland analysis, the Missouri Court of Appeals agreed 
and deemed Frye’s plea withdrawn and remanded to the lower court to either require a 
trial or to allow Frye to plead to any offense the prosecutor charged.  Id. at 139–40.  
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Id. at 140. 
 255. Id. at 143–44. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 143. 
 258. Id. (quoting Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170). 
 259. Id. at 144–45. 
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In Lafler, the Court sought to provide a remedy to defendants prejudiced 
by an attorney’s deficient performance where it results in the rejection of a plea 
offer and the defendant is convicted at trial.260  In tackling the remedy, the 
Court fashioned two alternatives and placed them both within the exclusive 
discretion of the trial judge.261  For the Court, the proper remedy required the 
prosecution to reoffer the plea.262  Once this occurs, the trial judge may decide, 
in her discretion, either to vacate the conviction and accept the plea or to allow 
the conviction to stand.263 
Justice Scalia, author of the dissents in both Frye and Lafler, rested his 
analysis primarily on the notion that the Sixth Amendment assistance of coun-
sel guarantees fair trials only.264  There is no right to a plea bargain, and because 
of this, defendants are not entitled to constitutional remedies premised upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel.265  For the dissenters, the “whole new bou-
tique of constitutional jurisprudence” is without a true remedy.266  The majority 
opinion, according to the dissenters, elevated “plea bargaining from a neces-
sary evil to a constitutional entitlement.”267 
The trilogy offered a re-commitment by the Court to honor established 
constitutional protections recognized in the context of criminal procedure.  In 
these cases, the Court revisited earlier doctrinal interpretations of the right to 
counsel, providing a glimpse of a resurgence of the egalitarian ideals in Powell 
and Gideon.  Why the shift?  While the Court’s composition drastically 
changed from the mid-1980s to the 2010s, the doctrinal treatment of right to 
counsel challenges remained constant.  I argue that two events, namely mass 
incarceration and a concern with the criminal justice system, worked to pro-
duce a wave of convergence between the dominant group and the subordinate 
group on the issue of criminal justice administration.  While not to the same 
degree as Powell and Gideon, this convergence repositioned the interest of 
working poor whites in line with that of minority communities, offering a 
 
 260. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 160.  In Lafler v. Cooper, the respondent was charged with 
a number of felonies, including assault with intent to murder.  Id. at 161.  Instead of 
pleading guilty pursuant to an offer made by the State where the respondent would 
serve fifty-one to eighty-five months, he elected to plead not guilty upon the advice of 
his attorney.  Id.  More specifically, respondent’s attorney allegedly stated that because 
the victim was shot below the waist, the prosecutor would be unable to prove intent to 
murder.  Id.  At trial, the respondent was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to 
the mandatory minimum of 185 to 360 months in prison.  Id. 
 261. Id. at 170–71. 
 262. Id. at 171. 
 263. Id.  The Court reasoned that this permits the injury suffered by the defendant 
to be reviewed by the trial court and, in turn, allows the trial court to evaluate the case 
within proper constitutional guidelines.  Id. 
 264. Frye, 566 U.S. at 155 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler, 566 U.S. at 175–76 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 265. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 180–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 266. Id. at 186. 
 267. Id. 
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stronger and more cohesive interest in remedying defects in the justice system.  
The plea bargaining trilogy offers a series of contradiction-closing cases that 
provided an official condemnation of egregious justice system practices. 
First, the plea bargaining cases indicated that the Court was still willing 
to address issues involving fairness and equality within the criminal justice 
context when necessary.  In the aftermath of 9/11 and the War on Terror, Amer-
ica’s struggle to maintain an international image of a free and equal society 
was tarnished by mass incarceration.  It is said that the United States has a “51st 
state” – its jails and prisons, with a “greater combined population than Alaska, 
North Dakota[,] and South Dakota.”268  The incarceration rate in American has 
increased by 500% in the last forty years.269  The non-violent prison population 
alone is larger than the combined populations of Alaska and Wyoming.270  
Compared to other nations, the United States rate of imprisonment is 750 per 
100,000, versus 628 per 100,000 in Russia and 67 per 100,000 in Denmark.271  
In 2009, 1 out of every 136 U.S. residents was incarcerated, either in prison or 
jail.272  At last count, the total number of imprisoned persons was 2,297,400, 
with 1,617,478 in state and federal prisons and 679,992 in local jails.273  Ap-
proximately 80% of those charged with a criminal offense are poor,274 and over 
two-thirds are a racial minority.275  For black defendants, the situation is bleak.  
In 1960, the incarceration rate for African Americans was 660 per 100,000 
people.276  In 2010, the incarceration rate for black men was 3074 per 100,000 
people.277  In addition, the extra pressures from the Great Recession required 
the reexamination of government spending, uncovering astronomical criminal 
 
 268. Vincent Schiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg, 2 Million Prisoners in the Land of the 
Free, SFGATE (Dec. 26, 1999, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/2-
million-prisoners-in-the-Land-of-the-Free-3053456.php. 
 269. Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENT’G PROJECT 2, http://sen-
tencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf (last 
updated Dec. 2015) (measuring incarceration trends from 1985 to 2013). 
 270. John Irwin et al., America’s One Million Nonviolent Prisoners, JUST. POL’Y 
INST. 4 (Mar. 1999), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/99-
03_REP_OneMillionNonviolentPrisoners_AC.pdf. 
 271. PEW, One in 100, supra note 235, at 5, 35. 
 272. PEW, One in 31, supra note 236. 
 273. Prison Inmates at Midyear 2009 – Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 
(June 23, 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2200. 
 274. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A 
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006). 
 275. Irwin et al., supra note 270. 
 276. Bruce Drake, Incarceration Gap Widens Between Whites and Blacks, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/06/incarcer-
ation-gap-between-whites-and-blacks-widens/. 
 277. Paul Guerino et al., Prisoners in 2010, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 27 (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 
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justice expenditures.278  With the justice system under scrutiny, the plea bar-
gaining cases served as a symbolic check on problems inherent in the system. 
Second, the trilogy reflected the political culture’s broader concern with 
the effectiveness of criminal justice administration.  In requiring effective as-
sistance of counsel during plea negotiations, the Court signaled a possible re-
turn to its position as guardian of the subordinate group in the exercise of its 
civil rights.  While the majority opinions in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler offered a 
pragmatic justification for the outcomes, the bases of the decisions were 
strongly criticized by the dissents for the lack of textual backing.279  By recog-
nizing the significance of plea bargaining, the Court opted to resolve the cases 
on the basis of “the world as it is.”  As the Court recognized, guilty plea dispo-
sitions comprise at least 98% of federal criminal cases280 and 94% of state 
criminal cases.281  Since 1977, the ratio of federal criminal defendants who 
exercise their right to a jury trial has decreased from 25% to 3%.282  Before 
Padilla, scholars and advocates vociferously criticized plea bargaining, noting 
a number of issues in the negotiation process.283  Understanding that the lack 
of transparency in the process insulates it from judicial review, criticisms lev-
ied against the process called for regulation and constitutional protections for 
defendants, many of whom are the least able to represent themselves – poor, 
uneducated, and often times minority.284  Moreover, thousands of courts across 
the country serve simply as plea mills, churning out a profit for the locale.285  
From traffic violations, to misdemeanors, to felony charges, judges conduct 
hearings and take pleas without the defendant ever consulting with or being 
 
 278. PEW, One in 100, supra note 235, at 11.  Expenditures on corrections were 
reported to overtake state budgets for education.  Id. at 16.  Total state spending on 
corrections, including federal contributions, is estimated at $49 billion annually.  Id. at 
11.  Recent figures regarding state spending on individual prisoners is estimated at an 
annual average cost of $23,876 (2005 figures) and can range from $44,860 per inmate 
(in Rhode Island) to $13,009 (in Louisiana).  Id. 
 279. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 151–55 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler 
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 177–78, 186–87 (2012) (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 280. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 242–45 (2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2010judicialbusiness_0.pdf. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Matthew Clark, Dramatic Increase in the Number of Cases Being Plea Bar-
gained, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegal-
news.org/news/2013/jan/15/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-criminal-cases-being-
plea-bargained/. 
 283. Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2651 
(2013); Stephen J. Shulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 
1039–45 (1984); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. 
L. REV. 652, 658 (1981). 
 284. Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 
YALE. L.J. 2176, 2178 (2013). 
 285. Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance 
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013). 
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represented by a lawyer.286  Individuals plead guilty on the advice of a lawyer 
that they just met minutes before.287  Without an official declaration regarding 
constitutional protections afforded defendants during plea bargaining, govern-
ments could continue to operate in a shadow adversarial system off the record 
and outside of public purview.  Ignoring the realities of plea bargaining was to 
silently sanction egregious mistakes and grossly negligent conduct, which no 
doubt play a role in the unnecessary addition of years to prison terms, in turn, 
contributing to mass incarceration in a technical sense.  It is in this context that 
the plea bargaining cases were decided. 
Applying interest convergence to the trilogy requires a basic understand-
ing that eras of convergence will vary in terms of the breadth and the depth to 
which the interests converge.  While the level of convergence may not appear 
as strong as that in Powell and Gideon, a convergence existed nevertheless.  
The dominant group, concerned with maintaining a reputation of a free and 
equal America, was interested in proving its commitment to fair treatment, de-
spite being the world’s leading jailer.  The subordinate group, interested in the 
wholesale reformation of the criminal justice system, gladly welcomed the 
Court’s intervention in the shadow system of plea bargaining.  For this group, 
some protection was better than none.  The trilogy thus offered a series of con-
tradiction-closing cases, implicitly affirming America’s commitment to equal 
justice. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Interest convergence as a theoretical paradigm is rational.  It not only con-
siders process and outcome variables in its analysis, it allows for the consider-
ation of “the world as it is.”  While traditional modes of interpretation guide 
the Court, the Justices lead and operate the institution; they are human beings 
bringing with them their own sets of values and interests.  Interest convergence 
approves of using external factors in assessing judicial decision-making, thus 
allowing consideration of important occurrences and events that the Justices 
themselves experienced at the time of each opinion. 
During each era of convergence, the contradiction-closing cases reflected 
the will of the dominant group, while simultaneously conceding to the subor-
dinate group.  While Powell and Gideon theoretically placed indigent defend-
ants on an equal playing field, the dominant group benefitted with the opinions, 
adding to the rehabilitation of America’s image in both cases domestically and 
internationally.  Similarly, in the plea bargaining trilogy, the subordinate group 
received a constitutional protection in the guarantee of counsel during plea bar-
gaining, while the dominant group sought to buttress and rehabilitate Amer-
ica’s reputation as a prison state, both home and abroad.  Strickland and Hill, 
decided during a time of divergence, mirrored the conservative retrenchment 
 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
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of the dominant group, failing to provide any gains or concessions to the polit-
ical powerless. 
Many scholars perceive the Gideon decision as a victory for individual 
rights in which the power of the justice system would be tempered by the con-
stitutional guarantee of defense counsel.  Frye and Lafler are also celebrated as 
triumphs and natural extensions of the principles pronounced in Gideon.  There 
is, however, a different perception of the Gideon legacy.  In the recent Yale 
Law Journal Symposium, recognizing the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon, Pro-
fessor Paul Butler claimed that the decision worsened the plight of poor and 
minority persons generally:288 
The reason that prisons are filled with poor people, and that rich people 
rarely go to prison . . . is because prison is for the poor, and not the rich.  
In criminal cases poor people lose most of the time, not because indi-
gent defense is inadequately funded, although it is, and not because de-
fense attorneys for poor people are ineffective, although some are.  Poor 
people lose, most of the time, because in American criminal justice, 
poor people are losers.  Prison is designed for them.  This is the real 
crisis of indigent defense.  Gideon obscures this reality, and in this sense 
stands in the way of the political mobilization that will be required to 
transform criminal justice.289 
Butler argued that Gideon makes the lawyer an end instead of a means to an 
end.290  It seems the system still will over-punish and disproportionately charge 
poor people and minorities, whether or not a lawyer is involved. 
If we are to fix the problems, we must first see “the world as it is” and 
affect our strategy accordingly.  Applying theoretical frames that consider ex-
ternal considerations in judicial decision-making, such as interest convergence, 
may allow for a more comprehensive understanding of judicial trends and out-
comes.  Understanding that political culture may influence judicial decision-
making allows the justice system’s actors to adjust their strategies more com-
pletely.  Neglecting to include socio-political factors is to ignore a very basic 
detail: humans do not live in vacuums, including the Justices on the Court.  In 
the “world as it is,” the people ring the bell, the gladiators enter the arena, and 
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